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In this paper I address the question to what extent wages are affected by product market uncertainty. Im-
plicit contract models imply that it is Pareto optimal for risk neutral ﬁrms to provide insurance to risk averse
workers against shocks. Using matched employer-employee dataset, I adopted the estimation strategy pro-
posed by Guiso et al. (2005) to evaluate wage responses to both permanent and transitory shocks in Hungary
and compared my results to similar studies on Italian and Portuguese datasets. I found that ﬁrms do insure
workers against product market uncertainties, but the magnitude of the wage response differs depending on
the nature of the shock. Broadly speaking, the wage response to permanent shocks is twice as high as the
response to transitory shocks. Comparing my results to the two other studies, the main difference lies in the
elasticity of wages to transitory shocks. Unlike these previous ﬁndings, my results show that full insurance
to transitory shocks is rejected.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C33, D21, J33, J41.
Keywords: product market uncertainty, risk sharing, wage insurance, optimal wage contract, matched
employer-employee data.
Összefoglalás
A tanulmány azt vizsgálja, hogy a termékpiacot övez˝ o bizonytalan környezet miképp hat a munkabérekre.
Az implicit szerz˝ odés modellek szerint a kockázatsemleges vállalatoknak Pareto-optimális biztosítani koc-
kázatkerül˝ o munkavállalóikat a vállalatot ér˝ o egyéni sokkok ellen. Összekapcsolt vállalati-munkavállalói
adatbázison Guiso et al. (2005) módszerét alkalmazva megbecsültem, hogy Magyarországon hogyan reagál-
nak a munkabérek átmeneti-, illetve tartós sokkokra, majd összevetettem eredményeimet hasonló, olasz és
portugál adatokon elvégzett tanulmányok eredményeivel. Azt találtam, hogy a munkáltatók valóban bizto-
sítjákmunkavállalóikat, asokklefutásátólfügg˝ oenazonbankülönböz˝ obérhatásokatkaptam: tartóssokkraa
bérek nagyjából kétszer olyan mértékben reagálnak, mint átmeneti sokkok esetén. Összehasonlítva eredmé-
nyeimet a két korábbi tanulmánnyal szembet˝ un˝ o, hogy a legnagyobb különbséget a bérek átmeneti sokkokra
való reakciója adja. Ezen tanulmányokkal szemben eredményeim elvetik, hogy Magyarországon az átmeneti
sokkok ellen a munkavállalók teljes mértékben védve lennének.
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Itisnowadaysagreedthatthemarketforlabourcannotberepresentedsatisfactorilybyastandardcompetitive
model and thus workers’ wages are positively correlated with employer’s ability to pay. According to the
efﬁciency wage theory, managers tend to pay more than the market-clearing wage in order to attract more
able job-seekers, to encourage workers and to minimize turnover. However, employees are generally viewed
as risk-averse and, as such, they derive negative utility from the increase in the wage income variance. On
the other hand, the owners of the ﬁrms have better access to capital markets and can more easily diversify
idiosyncratic risks away. It follows that in the presence of uncertainty about future market conditions, it
is Pareto optimal for risk neutral ﬁrms to provide insurance to risk averse workers against shocks. That is
managers commit to pay a pre-agreed wage independently of product market ﬂuctuations.
In this paper I address the question to what extent wages are affected by product market uncertainty. Using
matched employer-employee dataset, I followed the estimation strategy proposed by Guiso et al. (2005) to
evaluate wage responses to both permanent (mostly technological changes but also persistent demand shocks)
and transitory shocks (temporary changes in demand or, for example, machine breakdowns) in Hungary and
compared my results to similar studies on Italian and Portuguese datasets. I found that unlike Portuguese
and Italian ﬁrms, Hungarian ﬁrms do not fully insure workers against transitory shocks. Wage responses
to permanent value-added shocks are also higher indicating that, at least in this dimension, wages are more
ﬂexible in Hungary than in many Western European countries.
A set of factors may help to support the reason why the Hungarian case differs from the Italian and the
Portuguese one. First, borrowing constraints for ﬁrms may serve as argument in favour of less insurance.
According to the existing literature, for economies with a highly volatile macroeconomic environment, ﬁ-
nancial market imperfections may make it optimal to provide less insurance to employees. For Hungary, an
economy in transition with relatively high volatility of macroeconomic shocks and lower degree of ﬁnancial
market development than Western European countries, these ﬁndings provide a possible explanation for the
results I obtained. Second, the difference in insurance against transitory ﬂuctuations and persistent shocks
only makes sense if ﬁrms can accurately recognize the nature of the shock. Again, the continuously restruc-
turing economic environment with hardly predictable future path of the shocks may force Hungarian ﬁrms
to stay, in many cases, on the safe side and react to a variety of shocks of a different nature as if they were per-
sistent. And ﬁnally, the institutional background may play a major role in the amount of insurance provided
by the ﬁrms. Like in most of the New Member States, companies operating in Hungary face much less con-
straints either in negotiating individual wages or on lay-offs. The insigniﬁcance of collective bargaining, the
low level of unionization, the quasi-absence of indexation mechanism and the weak employment protection
system give ﬁrms a lot of freedom for adjustments along both the intensive and extensive margins. Under
these circumstances, ﬁrms can credibly use performance pay and the threat of layoff to motivate workers to
a greater extent.
Wage ﬂexibility is generally deemed to be good for employment and economic prosperity. If wages are more
responsive to labour and product market conditions, the real ﬂuctuations generated by both demand and
supply shocks are smaller and the economy can operate at a higher level of activity without inﬂationary
pressures. Furthermore, wage ﬂexibility is often cited as the main substitute for an own monetary policy.
In this respect, results are comforting as ﬁrms can more easily attenuate adverse shocks so common in an
economy in transition. On the other hand, the negative aspect of this speciﬁc dimension of wage ﬂexibility
liesinthewelfarecostsgeneratedbyhighervolatilityofwages. Itisatrade-offbetweenﬂexibilityandsecurity
and policy makers should deﬁnitely keep both aspects in mind when taking decisions.
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Itisnowadaysagreedthatthemarketforlabourcannotberepresentedsatisfactorilybyastandardcompetitive
model and thus workers’ wages are positively correlated with employer’s ability to pay. An early work
of Slichter (1950) showed that a competitive model fails to explain the observed wage differences between
apparently homogeneous types of employees in different industries. Later, several empirical studies have
recorded signiﬁcant positive correlation between wages and proﬁts using a richer and more detailed database
than Slicher’s. For instance, the efﬁciency wage theory provides an explanation for this phenomenon by
arguing that, at least in some speciﬁc markets, managers pay more than the market-clearing wage in order
to attract more able job-seekers, to encourage workers to increase effort and to minimize turnover. As
a consequence, more able employees with higher level of effort and low turnover would increase ﬁrm’s
productivity.1
In most of the cases, ﬁrms’ proﬁts (or value-added) ﬂuctuate so heavily that if wages followed them one-to-
one, workers would suffer from excessively high jumps in their wages. Employees are generally viewed as
risk-averse and, as such, they derive negative utility from the increase in the wage income variance. On the
other hand, the owners of the ﬁrms (shareholders) have better access to ﬁnancial markets and consequently
they can more easily cover themselves against idiosyncratic risks by diversifying their portfolio of assets.
It follows that in the presence of uncertainty about future market conditions it is Pareto optimal for risk
neutral ﬁrms to provide insurance to risk averse workers against shocks. That is, managers commit to pay a
pre-agreed wage, independently of product market ﬂuctuations.
Several empirical studies have tried to capture the existence of implicit insurance contracts between ﬁrms and
workers. The ﬁrst few studies used aggregate industry data (e.g. Gamber (1988)). Later, Beaudry & DiNardo
(1991), Weinberg (2001) and Devereux (2005) used individual data on workers, but still deﬁned shocks at
the industry level. Nevertheless, as argued in Guiso et al. (2005), aggregate shocks are not diversiﬁable and
consequently the positive correlation between aggregate productivity or demand shocks and workers’ wages
maysimplyreﬂectequilibriumresponseofwagestomacroeconomicshocksandnotnecessarilytheinsurance
between employers and employees. Indeed, the backward looking behaviour of economic agents in the basic
Calvo model also ensures that real wages do not fully reﬂect output shocks. Similar results have been found
by Pissarides (1985), who explain wage sluggishness by search and matching frictions.
Guisoetal.(2005)weretheﬁrsttorelyonlongitudinalmatchedemployer-employeemicrodatasettoquantify
the impact of ﬁrm-level value-added shocks on individual wages. They allowed workers’ wages to respond to
both permanent and transitory shocks to the ﬁrm and they found that Italian ﬁrms provide full insurance
against temporary shocks and only partial insurance against permanent shocks. Having replicated their
empirical identiﬁcation strategy, Cardoso & Portela (2005) have found similar results on Portuguese data.
In line with these previous studies, this paper presents an empirical analysis of wage responses to ﬁrm level
shocks in Hungary following a similar methodology as in Guiso et al. (2005). One contribution of this paper
is to adapt their estimation method to the case of dataset with panel structure for ﬁrms, but only repeated
cross-sections for workers. In addition, I also use a more accurate productivity measure to evaluate its impact
on workers’ wages. However, the paper stresses the fact that these necessary extensions do not bias the results
and the estimated parameters remain comparable to the previous ﬁndings.
The re-examination of the sensitivity of wages to idiosyncratic shocks on Hungarian data has the advantage
that the economic and institutional background in this country differs substantially from the Italian and
Portuguese environment in many respects. Like in most of the New Member States, the Hungarian labour
1 Although suggestive, these results were subject to a number of criticisms. The apparent correlation between pay and proﬁt may be caused by
unobservable industry/ﬁrm effects or employees’ personal characteristics. For example, more productive industries/ﬁrms may require both high pay
and a high rate of return on physical capital. The debate between competitive vs. efﬁciency wage theories is still not fully closed, however, other
theories have not much success in explaining seemingly wide wage dispersion for narrowly deﬁned occupations within one sector of one speciﬁc
location.
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market institutions are viewed as highly ﬂexible in EU-comparison (see Section 3). The insigniﬁcance of
collective bargaining, the low level of unionization, the quasi-absence of indexation mechanism and the weak
employment protection system give ﬁrms a lot of freedom for adjustments. In other words, the Hungarian
case can give insight into how ﬁrms and workers share the risk of business ﬂuctuations in a weakly regulated
setting.2
2 The Italian and Portuguese labour market are characterized by widespread unionization and relatively highly centralized wage bargaining system.
Despite of this, the authors of the two papers argue that the wage component determined at the ﬁrm level (between 1/6 and 1/4 in case of Italy, not
published for Portugal) is important enough for ﬁrms to inﬂuence the wages of their employees and thus, to test the existence of wage insurance within
the ﬁrm. This paper does not cast doubt on the relevance of their ﬁndings, I rather extend their results.
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Severalargumentshavebeenadvancedintheliteraturetosupporttheroleofemployersasinsuranceproviders.
In his seminal work, Knight (1921) describes entrepreneurs as "conﬁdent and venturesome", willing to as-
sume the risk while insuring the "doubtful and timid". Another argument is that entrepreneurs have better
access to capital markets and can more easily diversify idiosyncratic risks away, while workers cannot smooth
consumption privately because they have only limited access to credit markets. It follows that it is Pareto
optimal for risk neutral ﬁrms to provide insurance to risk averse workers and insulate their salaries from
adverse shocks to production, thereby improving the welfare of both parties. Although the extreme assump-
tion of risk neutrality for employers is not crucial, employers and workers must have different degrees of risk
aversion, with workers being more risk averse than employers.
The optimal risk allocation problem was ﬁrst formalized in implicit contract models of Baily (1974), Gordon
(1974) and Azariadis (1975). In these early models, workers sacriﬁce part of their expected salaries predicted
by spot labour markets and enter in a long-term implicit contract in which wages are less sensitive to demand
ﬂuctuations. As noted by Holmström (1981), the major weakness of these earliest theoretical contributions
is the assumption that the parties will never renege on the contract. If both workers and employers can end
the current relationship when better outside opportunities arise, the relationship continues only if contracts
are self-enforcing. In other words, parties will stick to the contract as long as it remains in their interest and
they will violate contractual agreements as soon as outside opportunities become "too attractive" for one of
the parties.
Theissueofenforceabilityofcontractshasbeenwidelyinvestigatedinthelastthreedecades. Modernimplicit
contract theory tries to set conditions under which the contract offsets any short-term gain from reneging
by greater long-term beneﬁts from compliance. The optimal contract depends on a set of factors such as
differences in risk aversion, the variability of performance and others. In particular, Gamber (1988) showed
that the possibility of bankruptcy constrains ﬁrms to provide insurance for the workers and consequently,
persistent shocks to performance are less likely to be insured than temporary shocks. Weiss (1984) demon-
strated that the higher the mobility costs are (including loss of speciﬁc human capital), the more insurance
ﬁrms can provide. Holmström (1981) suggests a reputation-building process as a mechanism to make con-
tracts enforceable. In the model of Harris & Holström (1982), ﬁrms have incomplete information about
the workers’ marginal product and update wages successively to prevent workers from quitting. Beaudry
& DiNardo (1991) and, more recently, Grant (2003) and Bertrand et al. (2004) used the unemployment rate
for proxying external opportunities for workers and found that real wages are renegotiated when either the
worker’s or the ﬁrm’s outside option constraints become binding.
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Generally speaking, the Hungarian labour market institutions are considered as highly liberal within Eu-
rope.3 Although both national and industry-level wage agreements exist in the country, the major part of the
wage bill is determined at the company or plant level. The national level forum for tripartite negotiations,
the National Interest Reconciliation Council (Országos Érdekegyeztet˝ o Tanács, OÉT) has little inﬂuence on
the factual wage growth and limits its role to provide recommendations and - as a key for inﬂuencing the
market - agree on the level of the statutory minimum wage. The coverage of sectoral collective agreements is
also low (less then 40%) by international comparison and the effect of extensions is not signiﬁcant either.
Typically, wage negotiations are conducted on an individual company basis and wage changes take place once
ayear. Thefrequencyofwagesettlementsisnotcompletelystableovertime, asasecondwageincreaseduring
the same year was somewhat more usual during the ﬁrst years of the transition period with high inﬂation.
Based on the Hey Group survey, the average number of wage increases within a year was around 1.2 in 2000
and the second wage change has almost entirely disappeared since then.4 In about half of the cases wage
changes take effect on the ﬁrst pay day in January each year. Another large fraction of wage changes take
effect in April-May (20-30% of the changes).
The Hungarian Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) also gives ﬁrms a lot of autonomy. As noted
in Horváth & Szalai (2007), EPL in Hungary is closer to the Anglo-Saxon countries than to most of the
European countries. Unlike many European countries with stricter EPL, there is no special procedure for
individual dismissal such as obligatory negotiations with the involvement of a third party(ies) or legal com-
mitment to support retraining of the employee. Social considerations do not need to be taken into account
either. In the case of collective dismissals, the State requires a notiﬁcation but there is no any additional rule
to follow.
In summary, the Hungarian labour market is much less regulated than those which served as a base for
previous similar empirical investigations. Companies face much less obstacles either in setting wages or
ﬁring and consequently ﬁrms have a lot of freedom for adjustments along both the intensive and extensive
margins.
3 A recent work of Horváth & Szalai (2007) gives a comprehensive overview of the labour market institutions in place in Hungary through several
dimensions.
4 Unfortunately, no data is available for earlier period.
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earnings
4.1 THE DATA
To put it simply, the basic idea underlying the identiﬁcation strategy is to estimate idiosyncratic shocks
to performance and to wages in the ﬁrst step, and estimate the sensitivity of wage shocks to ﬁrm-speciﬁc
changes in productivity in the second step. In case of full insurance, the two shocks should be orthogonal.
For this purpose I use two different datasets: ﬁrm-level shocks to output are estimated using the corporate
tax returns of all double entry book keeping ﬁrms operating in Hungary between 1993 and 2004 (Apeh
database); wage shocks are obtained using the National Labour Centre’s Wage Survey for the same period
which covers a representative sample of ﬁrms and on average a 10% sample of their workers. Both were
subject to several systematic checks and cleaning procedure. The two datasets are combined and constitute a
matched employer-employee dataset.
I restricted my analysis to non-farm and non ﬁnancial private companies with more than four employees. As
for the Apeh dataset, I ﬁltered out missing observations for value added, number of employees, capital and
input materials (12% of the total number of observation). I also checked for possible outliers: I eliminated
ﬁrms for which the capital to value-added ratio or the input material to value-added ratio is 1.5 times the
inter-quartile interval below the ﬁrst quartile or over the third quartile in a speciﬁc year in a speciﬁc industry
(4% of the observations).
The Wage Survey includes all companies above 20 employees and a random sample of those between 11 and
20 employees for the years 1995-1999 and between 5 and 20 employees for 2000 and later. In the case of
companies below 20 employees, all full-time employees were surveyed. In the case of companies above this
critical size, the sample includes all full-time employees born on the 5th, 15th or 25th of any month.
The serious deﬁciency of the wage survey is that individual observations are not linked across years, making
computation of individual wage growth rates and the use of lagged individual data impossible. For this reason
I necessarily depart from the estimation strategy of Guiso et al. (2005) and estimate wage equations at a more
aggregated level. Potential biases associated with this deﬁcit are discussed later.
The number of observations used for the analysis as well as basic descriptive statistics of the variables are
summarized in Table 1. Detailed information on the variables used is presented in the Appendix.
4.2 FIRMS’ PERFORMANCE
Shocks to ﬁrm’s performance are captured by the change in the residual of the production function. For
simplicity, I assume Cobb-Douglas technology:
qjt = αlljt +αkkjt +Z0
stγ + fj +"jt | {z }
Solow residual
(1)
where qjt, ljt and kjt stand for the value-added, labour and capital of ﬁrm j in time t. All variables are in
logarithms. The Solow residual is further decomposed into ﬁrm-level ﬁxed effect fj, aggregate shocks Z0
st
(year and industry dummies) and ﬁrm-level shock to value added "jt.
I estimated productions functions for each 2-digit industry separately using the Levinsohn & Petrin (2003)
method. However, some consecutive industries were merged to evade small samples.5 In the second step,
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Table 1
Worker and ﬁrm characteristics
mean std. dev. mean std. dev.
Value added 116.23 1811.61 386.53 3153.95
Number of employees 43.88 447.83 140.78 708.01
Capital 121.05 3053.88 416.10 4952.41
Nb. of observations 446184 78955
Nb. of firms 101659 23468
Gross earnings 24921 26272 25056 26440
Net earnings 17964 16454 18009 16586
Male 0.58 0.49 0.59 0.49
Age 39.23 10.81 39.17 10.88
Vocational 0.34 0.47 0.35 0.48
Secondary 0.34 0.47 0.34 0.47
Higher 0.13 0.33 0.13 0.33
Manager 0.11 0.32 0.11 0.32
Non-manual 0.29 0.45 0.28 0.45
Nb. of observations 1231069 1017164
Source: Wage Survey and Apeh database, 1993-2004
Notes: Value added and capital measured in million of HUF and earnings in HUF, all
expressed in 1991 prices. Value added is deflated by sectoral GDP deflator and earnings are
deflated by CPI. The capital stock was constructed following the procedure described in
Kátay and Wolf (2004). For firms, the "whole sample" includes non-farm and non financial
private companies with more then 4 employees, after missing variables and outliers are
removed. For workers, it is the largest simple for the same industries. The matched dataset
includes only observations for which we have contemporaneous observations on both the
worker and the firm.
Matched sample Whole sample
Firm characteristics
Woker characteristics
I took the differences of the estimated Solow-residual in order to eliminate ﬁrm-level ﬁxed effects fj and I
regressed out aggregate shocks Z0





residuals of this latter regression.
Note that I modeled ﬁrm performance differently than in Guiso et al. (2005) or Cardoso & Portela (2005).
These previous works used a simple AR(1) process augmented with additional dummies controlling for ag-
gregate shocks. As admitted by the authors, their model is much simpliﬁed and shocks to value-added should
be investigated once variation in the production factors, capital and labour, have been controlled for. How-
ever, Guiso et al. (2005) addressed this issue as a robustness check and after having controlled for capital and
labour, the estimated wage responses to both permanent and transitory value-added shocks conﬁrmed their
5 Similarly to Kátay & Wolf (2008), I have also taken into account the change in output price/input price ratio in the Levinsohn-Petrin estimation procedure
and included relative prices in the regression as an additional instrument. For the details, see the paper previously mentioned.
MNB WORKING PAPERS • 2008/8 11MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
baseline ﬁndings. Hence, the deviation from the benchmark procedure improves the precision of the mea-
surement of the shocks but has visibly little effect on the estimates of interest. Nevertheless, the simpliﬁed
versionof themodelmaywork inastable economysuchas inItalyorin Portugal, but asimpleAR(1)process
is much less likely to capture the data generating process in a transition economy with countless individual
and aggregate shocks. As for the estimation procedure, I choose Levinsohn-Petrin instead of GMM because
previous production function estimations on Hungarian data suggest that the former estimation procedure
enhance the accuracy of the parameters and provide more credible TFP measures.6
The estimated parameters of the production functions are presented in Table 2. Results are broadly in line
with expectations as the parameter estimates well reﬂect sectoral differences in labour and capital intensity.
On the other hand, the sum of the two coefﬁcients of the production function are generally lower than
unity implying decreasing returns to scale in most of the industries. While many of the previous papers on
production function estimation report higher returns to scale, my results are not out of line with the existing
empirical literature.7
Despitethedifferencesinmodelingﬁrm’sperformanceandtheestimationmethod,theautocorrelationstruc-
ture of the ﬁrm level value-added shocks is similar to the results reported in Guiso et al. (2005) (see Table 3).
The autocorrelation structure of shocks to value added is consistent with an MA(2) process: after 3 lags the
covariance of the ﬁrst-differenced residuals is insigniﬁcant.
As suggested by Guiso et al. (2005), the process for "jt can be represented as a sum of random walk and an
MA(1) component:
¨
"jt = ξjt +(1−θL)vjt
ξjt = ξjt−1 + ujt
(2)

























= 0 for all s and t, this representation is consistent with the autocovariance structure in Table 3.
Taking the ﬁrst difference of "jt leads to ∆"jt = (1−θL)∆vjt + ujt.
The advantage of this representation over a single variance component following an MA(2) process is that
it allows different shocks to have different dynamic inﬂuence on value-added: some shocks have permanent
effects (mostly technological changes but also persistent demand shocks), others are transitory by nature
(temporary changes in demand or, for example, machine breakdowns).8 Moreover, I performed the test for
the existence of a random walk component in the levels, as proposed by Meghir & Pistaferri (2004). The test
rejects the null hypothesis of the absence of such a component with a p-value inferior to 0.001.9
On the basis of this representation, equation (1) can be decomposed into the sum of a deterministic Djt, a
permanent Pjt and a transitory component Tjt:
qjt = Djt +Pjt +Tjt (3)
where Djt = αlljt +αkkjt +Z0
stγ + fj, Pjt = ξjt and Tjt = (1−θL)vjt
6 For detailed analysis of the estimated TFP measures, see Kátay & Wolf (2008).
7 See e.g. Fuss & Wintr (2008)








= 0. In case of a simple MA(2) representation, all shocks have
permanent effects or, if the two parameters of the MA(1) and MA(2) terms sum to -1, all shocks have only temporary effects.
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Table 2
Estimation results, production functions
coef. Z stat. coef. Z stat.
MINING AND QUARRYING 10 - 14 0.43 10.78 0.33 4.41
FOOD PRODUCTS AND BEVERAGES + TOBACCO 15 - 16 0.48 35.03 0.31 15.32
TEXTILES 17 0.60 25.35 0.26 9.87
WEARING APPAREL; DRESSING AND DYEING OF FUR 18 0.72 27.36 0.16 6.90
LEATHER AND LEATHER PRODUCTS 19 0.74 18.33 0.33 7.68
WOOD AND WOOD PRODUCTS 20 0.50 16.29 0.33 11.75
PAPER AND PAPER PRODUCTS 21 0.36 6.10 0.21 4.38
PUBLISHING, PRINTING 22 0.41 12.39 0.21 13.17
FUEL + CHEMICAL PRODUCTS 23 - 24 0.27 6.39 0.42 6.55
RUBBER AND PLASTIC PRODUCTS 25 0.50 17.55 0.29 11.61
OTHER NON-METALLIC MINERAL PRODUCTS 26 0.52 24.11 0.25 7.52
BASIC METALS 27 0.42 7.37 0.24 2.85
FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS 28 0.52 38.92 0.30 18.51
MACHINERY 29 0.54 34.89 0.26 10.80
OFFICE MACHINERY AND COMPUTERS 30 0.47 5.71 0.19 2.55
ELECTRICAL MACHINERY 31 0.49 11.71 0.37 5.45
COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT 32 0.48 13.87 0.29 7.15
MEDICAL, PRECISION AND OPTICAL INSTRUMENTS 33 0.40 10.08 0.30 8.41
MOTOR VEHICLES 34 0.46 10.20 0.49 5.92
OTHER TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT 35 0.59 6.50 0.22 2.25
MANUFACTURE OF FURNITURE + RECYCLING 36 - 37 0.50 17.13 0.27 7.19
ELECTRICITY, GAS, STEAM AND HOT WATER SUPPLY 40 0.49 12.87 0.20 2.12
COLLECTION AND DISTRIBUTION OF WATER 41 0.74 13.20 0.12 2.79
CONSTRUCTION 45 0.60 69.10 0.27 33.92
SALE AND REPAIR OF MOTOR VEHICLES 50 0.54 28.19 0.27 15.22
WHOLESALE TRADE 51 0.27 27.83 0.29 35.29
RETAIL TRADE 52 0.44 45.04 0.24 27.37
HOTELS AND RESTAURANTS 55 0.74 40.07 0.14 9.99
TRANSPORT 60 - 62 0.49 29.88 0.29 21.51
AUXILIARY TRANSPORT ACTIVITIES 63 0.60 26.05 0.24 9.97
POST AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS 64 0.48 12.13 0.20 3.48
REAL ESTATE ACTIVITIES 70 0.46 19.85 0.20 8.84
RENTING OF MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT 71 0.23 4.43 0.43 4.11
COMPUTER AND RELATED ACTIVITIES 72 0.58 19.39 0.27 14.23
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 73 0.43 8.39 0.30 6.22
OTHER BUSINESS ACTIVITIES 74 0.55 50.99 0.20 21.01
EDUCATION 80 0.43 8.70 0.31 7.70
HEALTH AND SOCIAL WORK 85 0.21 4.20 0.22 5.91
Source: Apeh database 1993-2004
Notes: The table reports sectoral level production function estimation results using Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) algorithm. For
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Table 3
Autocorrelation structure of shocks to value added






Notes: The autocorrelations are
computed using all years pooled.
4.3 WORKERS’ EARNINGS
I write the log wage of individual i working in ﬁrm j in a standard Mincer-type wage equation:
ϕ(L)wi jt = X 0
i jtδ +Fjt +αξjt +β(1−θL)vjt +ψi jt | {z }
ωi jt
(4)
where ϕ(L)wi jt is a lag structure of the natural logarithm of the net monthly wage of worker i in ﬁrm j in
period t, Xi jt is a set of observable individual characteristics (gender, age, occupation...) and Fjt includes
ﬁrm’s characteristics as well as a ﬁrm-level unobserved ﬁxed effect, industry and year dummies. Following
Guiso et al. (2005), I include in the wage regression the permanent and transitory components of the ﬁrm-
speciﬁc shocks, Pjt and Tjt, respectively. The parameters α and β show how these shocks translate into
wage changes. Remember that our database does not permit linking individual observation across years,
thus, worker ﬁxed effect remains in the error term ψi jt. This issue will be further investigated in Section 5.3.
In order to overcome the deﬁciency of our database, I aggregate the observations at the ﬁrm level. Taking the
ﬁrst differences of the variables yields to:
ϕ(L)∆ ¯ wjt = ∆ ¯ X 0
jtδ +∆Fjt +αujt +β(1−θL)∆vjt +∆ ¯ ψjt (5)
= ∆ ¯ X 0
jtδ +∆Fjt +∆ ¯ ωjt (6)
with ¯ ajt being the ﬁrm level weighted average of variable a = {w,X,ψ} at time t.
Equation (5) is estimated with Arrelano & Bond (1991) GMM technique, using lags 4-5 as instruments for
the endogenous variables. The estimation results are presented in Column 1 of Table 4.
As a robustness check, I also estimated ﬁrm-level ﬁxed effect model by taking the mean differences of all
variables, i.e.:
ϕ(L) ˜ wi jt = ˜ X 0
i jtδ + ˜ ψi jt (7)
where ˜ ai jt = ai jt − ¯ ajt,a = {w,X,ψ}
Mean differencing eliminates all ﬁrm level observed and unobserved terms and assuming that all variables in
X are exogenous and the error term is white noise, equation (7) can be estimated using OLS. This estimation
is presented in Column 2 of Table 4.
Comparing the two estimates, I found that the parameters of individual characteristics are close to each-other
and are broadly consistent with the results of other similar wage regressions. Wage surplus of managers and
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Table 4
Estimation results, wage equations
coef. Z stat. coef. Z stat.
Earnings growth at t-1 0.585 2.41
Earnings growth at t-2 -0.364 -1.90
Male 0.156 7.89 0.140 213.09
Age 0.026 5.42 0.022 123.09
Age square / 100 -0.025 -4.49 -0.020 -90.60
Vocational 0.089 5.82 0.096 116.50
Secondary 0.149 7.36 0.158 167.18
Higher 0.399 9.84 0.448 346.39
Manager 0.584 11.92 0.470 427.98
Non-manual 0.219 6.35 0.113 126.48
Wald test for year dummies 443.37 [<0.001]
Wald test for sector dummies 70.72 [<0.001]
Hansen J-test 21.87 [0.057]
AR2 test 2.01 [0.044]
AR3 test -2.33 [0.020]
AR4 test 1.14 [0.254]
AR5 test -1.76 [0.078]
AR6 test 0.69 [0.492]
AR7 test -0.65 [0.513]
aR2 0.414
RMSE 0.279
Source: Wage Survey, 1993-2004
Notes: The first column reports the results of the GMM regression of our baseline model on
firm-level average values (see text for details). Instruments are constructed using the GMM
approach of Arellano and Bond (1991) and include the log of earnings dated t-4 and
earlier. The second column presents the firm-level fixed effect estimation on individual
data. For year and sector dummies F-statistics are reported; values in brackets are p-values.






non-manual workers are somewhat higher in the baseline model than in the ﬁxed effect regression, but these
differences may be due to the fact that the classiﬁcation I used is very simpliﬁed and the variables may not
reﬂect homogeneous group of employees (see Appendix). Parameter of the lagged dependent variable in the
baseline model is also comparable to other studies. The second lag is also almost signiﬁcant at 5% so I left
it in the regression.10. The Hansen J-statistic indicates the validity of the instruments. The Arrelano-Bond
test for serial correlation of the differenced error term shows that the 3rd lag is still signiﬁcant and becomes
nonsigniﬁcant at lag 4. This autocorrelation structure is consistent with the choice of instruments (lag 4-5).
10 Dropping it out does not change the results
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5.1 IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY
I adopt the estimation strategy of Guiso et al. (2005) in order to estimate the two insurance parameters α and
β. The estimation strategy relies on two different instrumental variable regressions with different instru-
mentsallowingtheidentiﬁcationofthetwoparametersofinterest. Inbothcases, ∆ωi jt isregressedon∆"jt.




∆ ¯ ωjt −α∆"jt

= 0 allows




∆ ¯ ωjt −β∆"jt

= 0




is a valid set of




to estimate β, as for any k ≥ 1, these instruments are correlated
with the right-hand side variable ∆"jt and uncorrelated with the error term.11
5.2 RESULTS
I estimated α and β using feasible efﬁcient GMM procedure. The instruments were constructed for k = 1 to
5 as explained in the previous section. Results are presented in Table 5.
Table 5
Estimation results, sensitivity of earnings to value-added shocks
coef. Z stat. coef. Z stat.
Sensitivity 0.107 5.26 0.055 2.51
Hansen J-test 6.73 [0.151] 6.607 [0.158]
Source: Wage Survey and Apeh database, 1993-2004
Transitory shock Permanent shock
Notes: The table reports the GMM estimates of the sensitivity of wages to value-added
shocks. The estimation procedure and instruments are explained in the text.
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors estimates. Values in brackets are p-values.
In both regressions, the overidentifying restriction tests reinforce the validity of the instruments used. Both
the parameter of the permanent and the transitory shocks appear to be signiﬁcant, but the magnitude of the
response differs. Broadly speaking, the wage response to permanent shocks is twice as high as the response
to transitory shocks. Comparing my results to the two other studies it is seen that the wage sensitivity to
permanent shock is somewhat higher in Hungary than in Italy (α = 0.069) or in Portugal (α = 0.086). Never-
theless, the main difference in my results compared to these previous studies lies in the elasticity of wages to
transitory shocks. Recall that the two studies have found that ﬁrms provide full insurance against transitory
shocks to value-added in Italy and in Portugal, that is, the parameter β is close to zero and insigniﬁcant in
both cases. In case of Hungary, results show that full insurance to transitory shocks is rejected.12
11 The reason behind the validity of the orthogonality conditions is purely statistical. From (2) and (5), it is seen that ∆"jt = ujt +
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(β−α)(1−θL)∆vjt +∆ ¯ ψjt

= 0
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In order to give an idea of the signiﬁcance of these sensitivity parameters, it is sufﬁcient to have a look at
the total variability of the value-added shocks. The standard deviation of estimated shocks to value added
is 0.56, which is particularly high compared to the Italian results (0.24 for both transitory and permanent
shocks) but still lower then the variability obtained for Portugal (0.75 for the permanent shocks and 0.81 for
the transitory shocks). If we take the standard deviation of the mixture of transitory and permanent shocks
as the benchmark, a shock of this magnitude implies for workers an additional increase or decrease of their
wage by 6% if the shock is permanent and 3% if it is transitory. For comparison, the average wage change in
2004, for example, was 9.34%. One can conclude that after either permanent or transitory shock to ﬁrm’s
performance, deviation in workers’ wage growth from the average is quite substantial.
5.3 ROBUSTNESS CHECK
Before proclaiming that Hungarian workers are more exposed to product market ﬂuctuation than Western
European employees, some robustness checks are in order. Table 6 presents various deviations from the
baseline estimation. In particular I checked the robustness of my regression results to an alternative sample
selection of workers by excluding employees who entered the ﬁrm within a year (column 2); I tested whether
considering gross earnings instead of net earnings as a measure of compensation changes the results (column
3); and last but not least, I re-estimated the model by taking the simple non-weighted ﬁrm-level average of
the variables in the wage equation (5) (column 4). The results based on these alternative measures, sample se-
lection and aggregation method are similar to the baseline estimation. The sensitivity of wages to permanent
shocks is slightly higher in the case of gross earnings as the dependent variable and when I exclude new en-
trants, and it is somewhat lower if I do not use weights in the aggregation. As for the sensitivity to transitory
shock, the elasticity is faintly smaller when I restrict my analysis to workers with larger tenure track but still
largely different from zero.13 Nevertheless, these differences are not statistically signiﬁcant.
However, the issue of aggregation bias remains at the core of interest. Due to the nature of the database,
estimations were carried out at the company-level, while controlling for the composition of the workforce
within and between ﬁrms. As shown in the ﬁrm-level ﬁxed effect wage regression in Table 4, almost half
of the within-ﬁrm wage differentials is captured by the observed individual characteristics included in the
regression. The other half of the variation is not explained and incorporates unobserved worker ﬁxed effects
(let’s say fi) associated with individuals’ abilities and outside opportunities. Such unobserved component
remains in the residual of the wage equation and may bias the results of interest. In particular, if the compo-
sition of the workforce changes from one period to the other and the aggregate wage change associated with
the change in composition is not fully captured by the observed individual characteristics, the residual of the





6= 0. That is, in addition to its inﬂuence on individual wage growth, ﬁrms have the
possibility to adjust the composition of the workforce to a proﬁt maximizing level.
Whether this phenomenon biases the results or not is difﬁcult to answer. Obviously, if the pool of workers
in the sample does not change from period to period, worker ﬁxed effects cancel out when we take ﬁrst
differences and as ∆ ¯ fi = 0, no bias is present. Clearly, the drawback of the database is that one cannot
directly test the orthogonality between ∆ ¯ fi and ∆"jt. It is possible, however, to interfere manually in the
sampling and weighting scheme and thus to inﬂuence ∆ ¯ fi. For instance, the similarity of the results in
column 1, 2 and 4 of Table 6 suggests that different sampling and weighting procedure - which may affect
∆ ¯ fi - has little effect on the results and carefully insinuate that the aggregation bias is small or insigniﬁcant.
I also performed a bootstrap procedure in which I randomly dropped out 50% of the workers in each ﬁrm
each year, I aggregated the variables (without weighting) to the ﬁrm level and re-estimated the model. The
12 Full insurance means that wages shocks are orthogonal to shocks to value-added.
13 In that case, the Z-statistics are close to the 5% signiﬁcance level. Note that as I aggregate individual observations to the ﬁrm level, the number of
observation I use in the regressions is much smaller then the sample used in the Italian and Portuguese case, which may affect the signiﬁcance level
of the estimated parameters.
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strengthofthisbootstrapproceduredependson, forexample, thesizeofthesampleandthesubsample: when
the sample size goes to inﬁnity, the half-sample is expected to have the same statistical properties as the whole
sample and accordingly, the resampling procedure has little effect on ∆ ¯ fi. In our sample, the median number
of observations is 6 and the mean is 12.8 per ﬁrm per year. It is reasonable to assume that the bootstrap
procedure I used has a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the distribution of the workers and consequently on ∆ ¯ fi.
After 30 iterations, the standard deviations of the estimated parameters (0.033 for α and 0.017 for β) indicate
that results are robust for different samplings and consequently the change in the workforce composition has
only marginal effect on the results.
Another possibility for testing the aggregation bias is to create longitudinal links using individuals’ observed
characteristics and re-estimate the model on the individual data. Evidently, linking individuals manually
might create measurement error in the differenced variables, the size of which largely depends on the nar-
rowness of the classiﬁcation of the variables used for creating longitudinal links. In this experiment, I linked
observations within the same ﬁrm using gender, birth date (year and month for 2002-2004 and only year for
the earlier period), educational level and the detailed, 4-digit ISCO (International Standard Classiﬁcation of
Occupations) classiﬁcation. This latter criterion also ensures that workers changing occupation are excluded
from the experiment and wage changes associated with occupational changes do not affect the results. In
order to minimize the measurement error I restricted my analysis to the years 1996-2004, as from 1996, in-
formation on educational level is more detailed (9 classes instead of 5). The database contains information on
tenure after 2002 which I have also taken into account when creating individual links. In cases where I found
more than one possible link for a speciﬁc observation, I excluded it from the analysis. I also dropped out
observations for which a link was created and the worker was registered as new entrant. As a result, I found
at least one preceding observation for 29% of the cases. Knowing that only around 10% of the individuals
are new entrants, this result seems rather poor. Nevertheless, the strategy I used minimizes the risk of using
erroneous links and the resulting database is still large enough to perform the robustness check. Results are
presented in the last column of Table 6 and are very similar to the baseline ﬁndings. As the sample size
increases considerably when using individual data, it is not surprising that the signiﬁcance intervals of the
regression coefﬁcients are reduced. On the other hand, Hansen’s tests of overidentifying restrictions are in
fact rejected at the 5% level but the statistics are not far from the acceptable range, especially in case of the
sensitivity to the transitory shocks. Since the reliability of the longitudinal links is subject to scepticism, I
have also tested whether results are sensitive to extreme values of wage increases by recursively reestimating
the model for different outlier-thresholds (1st to 99th, 5th to 95th and 10th to 90th percentiles of the distribu-
tion). All these estimates are signiﬁcantly different from zero and fall inside the 95% conﬁdence interval of
the original estimation.
Probably the most convincing way to rule out all doubt about the aggregation bias is to estimate the parame-
ters of interest using both the original procedure and the aggregated version on an adequate panel dataset and
compare the results. Re-estimating the model published in Guiso et al. (2005) on the same Italian database
using my estimation strategy produces similar parameter estimates to the original. Most importantly the
parameter of the transitory shock remains close to zero and insigniﬁcant.14 This experiment together with
the previous statistical tests provide robust evidence to discard the aggregation bias.
5.4 WHAT MAKES THE DIFFERENCE?
A set of factors may help to support the reason why the Hungarian case differs from the Italian and the
Portuguese one. These factors may be related to the combination of the economic environment and the
institutional background. Due to the lack of an adequate database, the inﬂuence of these factors is hard
to test directly and this challenge deﬁnitely represents a new research direction. At this stage it would be
pretentious to make clear the reasons behind the peculiarity of the Hungarian results or even to give an
14 These results are not published in this paper. I am heavily indebted to Fabiano Schivardi, who helped me a lot by comparing the two estimation
methods on the Italian dataset.
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Table 6
Robustness checks
coef. Z stat. coef. Z stat. coef. Z stat. coef. Z stat. coef. Z stat.
Sensitivity 0.107 5.26 0.121 6.24 0.128 6.44 0.071 3.33 0.093 7.47
Hansen J-test 6.73 [0.151] 6.392 [0.172] 5.736 [0.220] 4.061 [0.398] 11.082 [0.026]
coef. Z stat. coef. Z stat. coef. Z stat. coef. Z stat. coef. Z stat.
Sensitivity 0.055 2.51 0.038 1.82 0.043 2.16 0.057 2.45 0.047 3.12
Hansen J-test 6.61 [0.158] 2.442 [0.655] 4.608 [0.330] 5.352 [0.253] 9.515 [0.049]




Notes: The table reports the GMM estimates of the sensitivity of wages to value-added shocks. Columns 1 to 4 report estimation results on firm-level aggregated data for
the whole sample (1993-2004) and the last column presents results obtained using manually linked individual data for years 1996-2004. The estimation procedure and
instruments are explained in the text. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors estimates. Values in brackets are p-values.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)




exhaustive review of all possible explanations. Based on the theoretical literature, previous empirical ﬁndings
and on common sense, this section is rather intent to set the possible directions to follow.
First, borrowing constraints for ﬁrms may serve as argument in favour of less insurance. In case of imperfect
capital markets, the optimal risk allocation between ﬁrm and workers is a result of counter-weighting gains
from reducing the variability in the compensation of risk averse workers and increasing cost of external
capital and tightening borrowing constraints caused by higher leverage.15. Kharroubi (2004) also shows that
in economies with highly volatile macroeconomic environment, ﬁnancial market imperfections may make it
optimal to provide less insurance to employees. For Hungary, being an economy in transition with relatively
high volatility of macroeconomic shocks and lower degree of ﬁnancial market development than Western
European countries, these ﬁndings provide a possible explanation for the results I obtained.
Second, the difference in insurance against transitory ﬂuctuations and persistent shocks only makes sense
if ﬁrms can accurately recognize the nature of the shock. Again, the continuously restructuring economic
environment with hardly predictable future path of the shocks may force ﬁrms to stay, in many cases, on the
safe side and react to a variety of shocks of different nature as if they were persistent.
And ﬁnally, the institutional background may play a major role in the amount of insurance provided by the
ﬁrms. As already mentioned, companies operating in Hungary face much less constraints either in negotiat-
ing individual wages or on lay-offs. Under these circumstances, ﬁrms can credibly use performance pay and
the threat of a layoff to motivate workers to a greater extent. As a side effect workers feel less secure in their
employment. Based on OECD measures of job security, Hungarian workers’ perception of employment
security is among the worst in Europe.16 If employees feel vulnerable about their job security and future job
prospects, enforcement problems may well arise as the attractiveness of a long-term implicit wage insurance
contract - which can be violated at any time - may be limited.
15 see e.g. Ichino (1994)
16 See Horváth & Szalai (2007) for details.
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This paper provides empirical evidence that Hungarian workers are more exposed to product market ﬂuc-
tuations in their wages than their Italian and Portuguese counterparts. Using matched employer-employee
dataset, I followed the estimation strategy proposed by Guiso et al. (2005) and later replicated by Cardoso
& Portela (2005) and I found that unlike Portuguese and Italian ﬁrms, Hungarian ﬁrms do not fully insure
workers against transitory shocks. Wage responses to permanent value-added shocks are also higher, indicat-
ing that at least in this dimension, wages are more ﬂexible in Hungary than in most of the Western European
countries. The paper puts emphasis on evaluating the possible bias that might arise as a result of the necessary
deviation from the original estimation procedure and strongly suggests that it has only marginal effect on the
parameters of interest.
Wage ﬂexibility is generally deemed to be good for employment and economic prosperity. If wages are more
responsive to labour and product market conditions, the real ﬂuctuations generated by both demand and
supply shocks are smaller and the economy can operate at a higher level of activity without inﬂationary
pressures. Furthermore, wage ﬂexibility is often cited as the main - though imperfect - substitute for an own
monetary policy. In this respect results are comforting as ﬁrms can more easily attenuate adverse shocks
which are so common in an economy in transition with often unpredictable economic policy. On the other
hand the negative aspect of this speciﬁc dimension of wage ﬂexibility lies in the welfare costs generated by
highervolatilityofwages. Itisatrade-offbetweenﬂexibilityandsecurityandpolicymakersshoulddeﬁnitely
keep both aspects in mind when taking decisions.
In order to clearly see the reasons behind my ﬁndings further investigation is required. Several arguments are
put forward in the paper supporting the results, such as tighter borrowing constraints for ﬁrms, the contin-
uously restructuring economic environment with hardly predictable future path of the shocks or the highly
ﬂexible labour market institutions in EU-comparison. Disentangling these effects is not a challenge for its
own sake. On the one hand, it is needed to better understand the consequences of these particularities of the
economy on the wage setting behaviour of the ﬁrms, and on the other hand to anticipate the evolution of
the ﬂexibility of wages in the future. One day Hungary is expected to catch up with Europe and most of the
speciﬁcities previously mentioned will vanish. Only the institutional background is expected to remain un-
changed without government intervention and consequently its effect on wage sensitivity to product market
ﬂuctuations would persist.
Finally, the paper reinforces that the European labour market is far from being homogeneous between coun-
tries. Similarly to Guiso et al. (2005) I also suggest extending the analysis to other countries, especially to
economies in transition. In fact the circumstances in which ﬁrms are operating in Hungary are rather close
to those of other New Member States in many respects. If not "only" ten million Hungarians are concerned
but the results presented in this paper are relevant to most of the Central and Eastern European countries, it
gives another dimension to these differences.
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As noted in Section 4.1, the variables used in this study come from two sources: corporate tax returns of all
double entry book keeping ﬁrms (Apeh database) and the National Labour Centre’s Wage Survey. Variables
are either taken directly from the datasets or constructed from variables available in the datasets.
Information on ﬁrms from the Apeh database:
Value added: Value added was calculated by subtracting the value of input material costs from the value
of turnover net of indirect taxes, deﬂated by the 2-digit sectoral GDP deﬂator. Due to change in
accountinglegislationin2001, totalturnoverincludesindirecttaxesaswell. Aswehavenoinformation
in the database on the magnitude of this latter, the bias was corrected by subscribing the industry-
level mean fraction of indirect taxes from total turnover. The following numbers are provided by the
Hungarian CSO, expressed as the ratio of indirect taxes in total turnover and in input material costs:

















Capital: The capital stock was constructed using the idea of the perpetual inventory method (PIM) as de-
scribed in Kátay & Wolf (2004).
Labour: Annual average full-time equivalent employment at the ﬁrm, rounded to the nearest integer.
Input materials: I used input material costs as a proxy in the Levisohn-Petrin procedure. It includes raw
materials and consumables, contracted services, other service activities, original cost of goods sold,
value of services sold (intermediated)17, deﬂated by sectoral input material price deﬂator. As yet the
Hungarian Central Statistics Ofﬁce has not published industry speciﬁc input material price indices,
hence I simply calculated them as the ratio of intermediate input material consumption (the difference
between sales and GDP) at current and constant prices.
Industry: Classiﬁcation based on NACE codes.
Information on workers from the Wage Survey:
Gross earnings: Gross monthly wage includes all regular and overtime pay plus nonwage compensation
paid to the worker in May, the month of the survey. I deﬂated earnings using the consumer price
index.
17 Terminology is taken from the ofﬁcial translation of the Act C of 2000 on Accounting.
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Net earnings: Net earnings were calculated by subtracting personal income tax, pension, social security and
employee contributions from gross earnings on the basis of the effective taxation legislation in a given
year. Tax credits are not taken into account.
Job grade: Simpliﬁed classiﬁcation based on ISCO (International Standard Classiﬁcation of Occupations)
codes. I deﬁned managers (1st major group), non-manual (2nd to 4th major group) and manual workers
(5th and greater major group)
New entrants: Workers who entered the ﬁrm within the last 12 months.
Individual characteristics: Gender, age and highest completed educational grade.
Individual weight: It is the number of workers represented by a respondent within the ﬁrm.
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